Embedded Files
In May/June of 1916, 40th Division comprised around 20,000 men, 6,000 horses, 64 Artillery pieces and over 1,000 vehicles. The initial moves took about a week to complete going from various camps around the Aldershot District to Southampton.
From Southampton to Le Havre took between 29th May and 5th June to complete, using various transport ships, two of which shown above were the SS France and SS Invicta, these two carried the Teesside Pioneers to France.
·The crossings where uneventful but as one Officer of the Battalion recorded in his diary
“Three am and we slowly recovered consciousness in the little cabin, apparently a second charthouse on the boat deck of the steamer the SS La France which had brought our Battalion of 900 from Southampton.”
The Party of five Officers then saw, with some relief the docks of Le Havre.
Following this 8-hour channel crossing, they reported, as having disembarked at 7 am. Without trouble…
After disembarking, the troops marched through the town of Havre, along the sea front, then a couple of miles uphill to reach, in the Teessider’s case, No2 Rest Camp.
Looking at the Battalion war diary and comparing it with the LE Havre Base Diary, by 5th June 40th Division was situated in various ‘Rest Camps’ around the Havre Base area ready for onward dispatch to a divisional Concentration Area.
Since 1914 men of two BEF’s have marched through this town, along the sea front and then up the hill to one of several ‘Rest Camps.
These camps were set up in the area around Le Havre, post 1914 when the original BEF had been despatched to France.
Intended for the reception of troops that may have been travelling for days, in 1916 they camps were much expanded and several further camps had been built.
As 40th Division arrived over 4-5 days, they were billeted in these temporary camps mainly under canvas, and eventually the Division’s arrival was completed...
From the camps they marched off to various rail Entrainment Points, were they boarded troop trains organised with, Third Class Carriages for the Officers but the ubiquitous 40 Hommes, 8 Chevaux Rail Cars for the men and horses.
That’s 40 Men or 12 Horses per wagon to you and me and having travelled in much the same way through West Germany on NATO exercises in 1982, I can attest to the uncomfortable ride.
Fortunately, it may have been only a few hours for myself in 1984 but for the Teesside boys in 1916, the journey could take up to 48 hours, with frequent stops to allow priority supply trains to pass along the Northern Line of Communication...
By 9th June the division had reached its concentration area ten miles West of Béthune, designated the Lillers-St. Hilaire-Rely-Febrin Palfart-Fontaine Les Hermans area. With 12th Yorks situated around Rely according to the war diary.
·On the 19th June operational Order No1 was issued by Divisional HQ, ordering the Division to move closer to Béthune and begin training by attachment to Divisions already in the Front Line.
During this time the Teesside men moved to MAHZINGARBE with W, Y & HQ Coys being attached to 15th Division, they were set to work on repairing and digging trenches in the ‘VILLAGE LINE’. Also, from the war diary X Coy was detached to work with 11 Hants at LOOS. 1 Man was killed and 10 Men wounded during this period whilst carrying out trench work, wiring and road repairs. On the 30th June the Battalion reformed and moved into 'HOUCHIN CAMP' near Bray.
The job with which the Teesside Pioneers are most usually associated with, was digging and given the original instruction by the War Office, that at least 60% of a Pioneer battalion should have been used to such work, this is hardly surprising.
It might seem an inglorious, and unenviable task but it was certainly dangerous and demanding and the 12th Bn. War Diary records the certain yardage of trench had been excavated each day.
What it does not so often mention is the circumstances in which that earth was dug: the consuming darkness, the energy-sapping mud, the loose tangled barbed wire which snagged and constricted movement, the marking tapes obliterated by shell fire, the shrieking arrival of splintering shells, the searching traverses of an enemy machine gun and the ever-present horrors of insidious, seeping gas.
From K.W. Mitchinson’s excellent book ‘Pioneer Battalions in the Great War: Organized and Intelligent Labour ‘, by Pen & Sword Books.
Has one former Pioneer of the 7/DLI recalling:
“It is one thing to dig a trench through good, unbroken ground, but quite a different affair where the shell holes lie so thick that it is difficult to distinguish one crater from another, and the sides must be supported as one goes. ‘Clearing’ was an even more difficult task than digging … But when, following on days of fighting, the infantry, ashen white, bearded, and slimed with mud, came after relief down a communication trench newly dug, thankful for its protection, one felt amply repaid for the days and nights of unceasing labour”.
The Teesside Bn. Was equipped much like a Royal Engineer Field company, with various tools to assist them, such as the examples shown, every Infantry soldier had his own ‘Dibber’ or Small Entrenching tool. But when it came to serious trench digging the RE Shovel and Pick Axe were king, with the GS Shovel for clearing out and the Spade Mk III for initial ‘Spit Locking’ (or marking out of trenches).
Producing trenches similar to the model shown, 6’6” deep and 4’6” wide at the bottom of the trench, it provided sufficient room to enable men passing, its wall should be well revetted with wicker hurdles or salvaged doors for instance, with duck boards at the base to provide drainage.
A Fire Step 1’6” high, a Parapet at the Front of the trench (for support when firing over) sufficient to stop a rifle round passing through it.
A Parados was provided at the Rear to prevent shell splinters entering the trench from behind.
Traverses were provided to enable protection from shell detonation blowing along the length of a trench, or rifle fire being directed the length of the position.
Traverses were spaced to allow 30 men to fire from the fire step with sufficient room to use weapons effectively. (From the Manual of Military Engineering, 1905 and the RE Field Service Pocket Book 1915)
As well as the task of digging trenches, often, but not necessarily always, they would be working under the supervision of the RE, Pioneers excavated, revetted, trench boarded and constructed dugouts for instance. Pioneers were also used around the Divisional rear areas, creating and repairing the road system, which was a huge task given the amount of traffic using these old French, essentially farm tracks. Millions of tons of roadstone, had to be brought into the Corp areas and ‘dumped’ in Engineer parks, the Pioneers would then collect the required stone in GS Wagons and transport it to the work site where the road was being constructed or repaired.
The roads behind the front line were constantly being targeted by German heavy artillery Battery’s leaving huge craters which had to be filled in before the road surface could be reconstructed.
Various methods of road creation were used, using logs and fascines covered with stone tamped down to stabilise it and drainage ditches along each side to keep the road compacted. Nighttime working was also adopted to provide cover for wiring of positions along the divisional frontage or between various strong points.
The responsibilities of the junior officers in charge of working parties were not as straightforward as one might expect and the subaltern’s lot was not a happy one running any task. The commander of each Platoon work party, first had to go out alone into No Man’s Land to reconnoitre the ground and decide where new trenches should be dug. He needed to ascertain such points as depth of any existing trenches and how they were drained; commit to his memory any marked features on the ground and decide on the number of men he must take out to dig the required area.
He then has to organize the working party, arranging the rations, equipment, etc … find out the best route up to the area of the operation, check on the nearest Dressing Station… and make sure that every man has his rifle and equipment by his side in case of surprise enemy attack.
On most occasions, the Pioneer subaltern in charge of a party striving to wire or dig amidst the darkness of a hostile night must have felt very lonely. The responsibility of command, combined with a possible lack of confidence in his own technical ability, might have been sufficient for him to call down a torrent of abuse upon those who despatched him to the task. It is likely that his company commander or his C.O. had been directly responsible for sending him, but they were probably acting upon the orders of the CRE. The relationship between the Pioneers and the R.E. was of crucial importance to the completion of work coming under the aegis of ‘Field Engineering’ and thus to the overall efficiency of the Division.
Shown here, is a model of a so called ‘Ideal Trench’. It is deep enough to provide cover from fire, both small arms and artillery, the sides are well supported or ‘Revetted’ and a ‘Firing Step’ is provided to stand whilst firing weapons when repelling the enemy. The bottom of the trench is provided with a drainage channel, covered by ‘duckboards’ to keep feet above the water. Ideal is all well and good but a daily shower of 5.9’s and it soon becomes a nightmare.
On July 2nd 1916, 40th Div. took over its own sector of the front line at BRUAY relieving 1st Div. and coming under command of 1st Corp. Taking up positions on the Right Sector of the Corp area. The Regimental War diary tells us that, on the 3rd July 1916 the Teesside Pioneers took over billets and work from 6th Bn. Welch Regiment Pioneers, in the Loos area.
Working on clearing and revetting the trench lines and communication trenches around the ‘Double Crassier’. By the end of September, they reported that:
"Since the Battalion had come to LOOS, all main Communication Trenches have been repaired and sump holes dug up to SUPPORT LINE. Billets have been improved so that every man has a bunk. Work in the Keeps, confined to repairs. Still a bit of work to be done in B Keep EAST and WEST. Repairs to main roads in LOOS in progress.
Colonel Becher became the LOOS Garrison Commander during this time and along with their own work, the 12th Battalion also provided parties to garrison the ‘Keeps’ around the town. Throughout the time around Loos, they experienced a steady drip of casualties, not always from enemy action. In November 40th Div. were relieved but the Teessider's remained with 31st Div. working around the village of HEBUTERNE before finally rejoining the Div. in MAUREPAS just in time for Xmas 1916
Following the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line from 25th Feb to 5th April 1917 40th Div. were tasked with pushing forward and capturing the villages of La Vacquerie and Villers Plouich. The South Wales Borderers successfully attacking the ‘15 Ravine’ positions, and subsequently the ridge along which they advanced was named after them on trench maps as ‘Borderers Ridge’.
The terrain over which the attack was took place was open and undulating but intersected by numerous of these so-called ravines characteristic of this sector of the front and there was little or no cultivation, but the grass was thick and high.
The villages were mostly standing, but the enemy was using them as strong points, apparently the ground, was also ‘fairly free’ from shell holes and remained so for a considerable time after- wards. The first three weeks of April saw 40th Div move methodically forward following the Germans as they retreated into the newly built Hindenburg Line (Siegfriedstellung), destroying everything that could be used as they went. Following the taking of the ‘15 Ravine’ positions, by 119th Brigade, the Teesside Pioneers were tasked with digging a fire trench from the head of 15 Ravine to the Gouzecourt-Villers Plouich Road…
The disposition of XV Corps now was that the 8th Division was on the right, the 40th in the centre, and the 20th on the left. During the night of the 12th/13th the 8th Division captured Gouzeaucourt, and this operation was in connexion with an advance of the outpost line by the 121st Brigade. The latter met with no opposition, except upon the right here a sharp machine gun and rifle fire imposed some delay.
40th Div having worked its way forward to Gouzecourt Wood, and on April 20th attack orders were issued by the Division, for an important operation on the following day.
The 8th Division, on the right, would attack Gonnelieu, while the task of the 40th was to make good the spur north-west of that village, Fifteen Ravine, and then still north-westwards until touch w a s secured with the 20th Division on the left.
·The 40th Division had two brigades in the front line, of which the 119th was on the right, and in its sphere was the ravine. The 120th was on the left. The 121st Brigade had been at this time withdrawn from the front and was resting and refitting at Etricourt. A narrative written at the time informs us that
" partridges were plentiful, and there were many nests of young birds and subsequently coveys."
As for ‘Fifteen Ravine’, it derived its name from fifteen trees which had bordered it until they were destroyed by the Germans as they retired, doubtless realized their value as ranging marks for the British artillery. 15 ravine was more like, what those with experience of South Africa would call a " donga," and was nowhere more than ten feet deep.
At 1.30 p.m. on 22nd November a conference was held at Beaumetz, when a general outline was given as to an attack to be made on Bourlon Wood, a preliminary step being to take over the line held at that moment by 62nd Division.
·Orders for the latter operation were issued at four o'clock, the gist of them being that the 119th Brigade would be on the right, the 121st Brigade on the left, with General Willoughby's 120th Brigade in reserve.
Bourlon wood, sas some 600 acres in extent, and was a thickly timbered wood, situated on a ridge, the highest point of which rises to 150 feet above the level of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road. Rising at 1 in 20, the wood stands out prominently, comprised of principally Fir trees but with the occasional Oak. Being a very old wood the trees were large with dense undergrowth of Hazel and Large Aspens. Running through the wood were numerous tracks, the principle of which ran East-West through it. Very much like an English woodland with wide ‘drives’ running throughout, in places these drives were sunken which gave them good tactical value.
The night of the 22/23 Nov. was fairly quiet but the roads leading towards the front became very congested with traffic. On the morning of 23rd Nov there was a slight mist, which would favour the attackers and a few minutes before 11:00 am the shells from 40th Div artillery began bursting within the woods. 119th and 120th Bde’s began to move up behind the tanks provided for the assault, with 119th Bde pushing onwards into the wood, capturing the southern corner despite the dense undergrowth. At 11:30am the men of 229th Field Coy began moving the ample supplies of wire and pickets that had been left behind by the Germans as they retreated, these were used to wire in three infantry posts by 229, whilst 231 wired the left flank of the positions. Following heavy shelling of the wood over the next days, 40th div. were finally relieved by 62nd Div. and moved back to rest and refit.
The RE Field Coys and the 12th Yorks Pioneers however were ordered to remain behind coming under orders of 62nd Div...
As the positions became more defined, 231st and 229th RE and two Coys of Teesside Pioneers were tasked with wiring a large area of the front line and an operation was fixed for the night of November 27th, to accomplish this.
On the morning of that day Major Clarke (officer commanding 229th Field Company), Major Johnson, V.C. (officer commanding 231st Field Company), and Captain Harris (commanding the two companies of Teesside Pioneers), proceeded to make a daylight reconnaissance of the wood.
It was a fine day, with good visibility. The officers rode up the Cambrai Road shortly before ten o'clock, proceeding up the main centre ride of the wood on foot, calling at an infantry battalion headquarters in the quarry.
A halt was then made about halfway up the ride at the ‘kiosk’ (presumably it looked like a wooden news kiosk, found on most British railway stations), this being a wooden chalet and a relic of the days of peace.
An infantry company headquarters was situated in the basement of this ‘kiosk’, and information was obtained regarding the approximate position of the defensive posts and the present whereabouts of the enemy.
On reaching the main crossroad which led through the wood from Bourlon village to Fontaine-Notre Dame, the party turned left and followed the road in the direction of Bourlon village, keeping well down in the drainage ditch.
According to the map, they were then about 100 yards behind the line of the forward posts. The three climbed out of the drain, over the bank, and turned at right angles in a northerly direction to where an outpost was believed to be.
After traversing a distance, of about twenty-five yards a party of eight to twelve Germans sprang up at about forty yards away and fired a volley, killing Captain Harris on the spot.
Major Johnson and Major Clark sank into the scrub and worked their way back to the road, and under cover of the bank pushed on towards Bourlon village, with the idea of doubling back by a side path shown on the map, which would bring them approximately to the position where Captain Harris must be.
In the meantime, however, the Germans moved their position and suddenly appeared again, firing a further volley, one fatal shot catching Major Johnson through a vital spot in the neck.
Major Clark regained the road in safety by wriggling backwards through the scrub, pursued the whole time by a constant stream of bullets.
He returned to the Infantry company headquarters at the kiosk and though they were able to furnish a Lewis-gun detachment, they undertook to send out a search party at dusk to bring in Major Johnson and Captain Harris...
This unfortunate occurrence considerably delayed the reconnaissance for the wiring, but enough information was obtained to enable the approaches and line to be mapped out. The supply of wire and pickets from the rear Hindenburg Line at the foot of the wood was exhausted, and a large party of infantry and pioneers was organized to carry up material which was brought on G.S. wagons from Havrincourt to the west side of Graincourt. Unfortunately, two of the wagons were knocked out by a shell at the Graincourt dump. The wiring carrying party commenced their journey at 4 p.m. from the supply dump formed at the Anneux crossroads, the 229th Field Company officers and non-commissioned officers acting as guides for the combined forces, consisting of the 229th and 231st Field Companies, with “W” and “Y” Companies of the 12th Yorkshire Pioneers, in the charge of Lieutenant Crosby.
The weather deteriorated considerably before night fall, and the going in the wood was very heavy. Shrapnel continually burst overhead, causing numerous casualties to the party. The coils of barbed wire, each weighing 56lb, were slung on poles, with two men carrying one coil, and it says much for the spirit of the men already tired out with four days' fighting and shortage of sleep, that an unusually large proportion of the material was delivered on to the site. The actual wiring began shortly before nine o'clock, and after about four and a half hours' strenuous work a complete double-apron fence, in duplicate, extended from the junction with the left division on the outskirts of Bourlon village, to the junction with the Guards Division on the Bourlon -- Fontaine-Notre-Dame Road. The total length of the line was just over 1,150 yards, this including the wire put up on the previous nights.
It was for this exploit that the following message was transmitted to the C.R.E.,40th Division:
“The G.O.C. 62nd Division wishes to convey his appreciation of the fine work of the 40th Divisional Engineers and 12th Yorkshire Regiment (Pioneers) in Bourlon Wood, 29-11-17.”
Casualties were. Capt. Harris Missing, Presumed Killed, 2nd Lt Johnson RE Killed, with 10 Other rank’s Wounded, 2 Other Rank’s Killed...
Aerial View of Bourlon Wood. (IWM)
Undergrowth inside the wood. (IWM)
View down the Bourlon village Fontaine Notre Damme Road. (IWM)
View of the remains of Bourlon Village. (IWM)
On the 30th Nov the Germans counterattacked pushing the 40th Div. back and the wood eventually became untenable, finally a very depleted 40th Div was relieved again by 62nd Div.
That night not a great many men of the 40th Division, were actually left to be relieved. Of the Welsh Brigade a handful of armed scarecrows remained - the 12th South Wales Borderers alone had lost twenty-two officers, and 388 men killed, wounded or missing.
What had happened to 14th HLI was anyone's guess and only tenuous contact had been maintained with the East Surreys. Monday dawned bright and with a nip in the air. Quite early, staff cars began to line up near a hut in the grounds of Havrincourt chateau where a signboard bearing a pelican proclaimed the headquarters of the 62nd Division and the commander of IV Corps was about to hold a conference there.
12th Bn. However remained with 62nd Div. carrying out the wiring task as discussed previously, here is an interesting clip of film from a larger film made at the time of the Cambrai operations and comes from an American Archive on YouTube.
However 12th Bn. York. Regt. remained in the wood along with 62nd Div. carrying out the wiring task that was discussed previously, but remarkably here is an interesting film made at the time and now in the Imperial War Museum collections, of the Cambrai operations, that I located on YouTube
If you look closely from 7 mins 39 secs, some of men have collar badges which look like those of the Pioneer Battalion badge. They are also carrying GS tools and bags of wooden stakes, so were clearly leaving for a digging task, I have also noticed that the two Officers shown look remarkably like Capt. Clive Mildred of X Coy. and Capt. Alexandra of Y Coy.
So, could this possibly be a clip of the Teesside Pioneers as thhey were the only Pioneer Battalion present during Operations inside Bourlon Wood at that time, I’ll let you form your own opinion.
Following the relief of the 40th div after the Cambrai debacle, the Division went through the rest of the winter of 1917 absorbing replacements, training and with planned operations such as that on the 15th December when the 19th Royal Welch Fusiliers, carried out a large raid in the Gomiecourt area. So 1917 closed and a second Christmas with the Div no longer the ‘Forgotten Fortieth’ but now the ‘Victors of Bourlon wood’
January 1918 was a very cold time but not as bad as the mud and slime of the Somme.
In February 1918, with the continuing manpower shortages of the British forces, Divisions were reduced from 12 Battalions to 9, freeing up men to fill those units short of men.
Unfortunately, 19 RWF, 17th Welch Regt. And 11th Royal Lancaster Regt. were disbanded and broken up to fill the gaps following the Bourlon debacle. This meant that 119th Bde then constituted 13 East Surrey, 18 Welch and 21st Middlesex...
120th Bde then constituted 10/11th HLI, 14 HLI and 14 Argyll & SH...
121st Bde then constituted 12 Suffolk, 13 Yorks, and 20 Middlesex.
These changes resulted in 120th Bde becoming a Highland Bde.
By the end of February 1918, it had been realised that a German offensive was becoming more imminent and 40th Div moved to Basseux and becoming the Gen HQ reserve. In early March the Div was moved up to the area around Fleurbaix and Bac St Maur, Major General John Ponsonby’s Brigade, which had been seriously mauled during the Somme offensive, the survivors were transported north to the Lys where they were joined by many replacements. The line south of Armentières was traditionally a quiet area but the move unfortunately as we now know, placed Ponsonby’s men in the firing line of the German Spring Offensives.
Trench Raids had been planned for the night of 8th April and parties left their trenches and moved silently through the mist covering no man’s land. Two groups from 119 Brigade entered Necklace and Nephew Trenches after midnight, only to find them empty.
They would have found hundreds of assault troops waiting to attack if they had gone any further and then withdrew to the support trench to avoid casualties from the inevitable German retaliation barrage. Two companies of the 20th Middlesex also crossed no man’s land at around 3 am, only to be caught when the German bombardment began. None returned and it was some time before Lieutenant Colonel Vignoles realised they were missing.
Initially it was thought the bombardment was being fired in revenge for the Middlesex raid, but it was soon clear something more serious was happening and XV Corps’ headquarters issued the code word ‘Bustle’. It was time for everyone to man their battle positions.
The 2nd Portuguese Division were holding the Neuve Chapelle-Richebourg l’Avoué positions which meant General Gomes da Costa’s men had been holding a 5½-mile sector along the Layes stream, when the German attack broke through these Portuguese positions on the right flank of 40th Div. they then turned right and began attacking the flank of 40th Div.
Many of the Portuguese soldiers had left their trenches, hoping to escape the shelling, and while most headed to the rear, others risked crossing no man’s land to surrender. Nothing would be heard from the front line because those who stayed were either killed or captured by the first wave of storm troops and when news did start to come in, it was bad.
The Portuguese division was disintegrating, and General da Costa was the only one who remained unaffected by the depressing reports from the front. The Portuguese fell back across the Lawe, leaving 51st Division to support XI Corps’ troops on 9 April. The Portuguese, now in full retreat, left a huge gap in First Army’s line. The men of the Portuguese reserve brigade also joined in, when stragglers started passing through their lines and rumours of a disaster spread like a contagion. Da Costa had 3 Portuguese Brigades to man the Battle Zone but stragglers from the Forward Zone convinced them the battle was lost and virtually every man joined the exodus from the battlefield.
Although the raids on the night of 8 April are said to have left their ‘trenches’ the ‘Battle Zones’ however were only made up of redoubts, constructed from sandbags and timber and not ‘trenches’ and were utilising interlocking machine gun beaten zones, for defence as the wire was also quite poor, and once the German attacks had broken through the Portuguese positions on the right flank of 40th Div. they had turned right attacking the now exposed flank of Lieutenant Colonel Brown, who reported that the 18th Welsh’s left company had been outflanked while his right company had been cut off. The reserve company was eventually overrun, with only sixteen wounded men said to have been taken prisoner. The Germans then carried on and attacked Col. Brown’s headquarters next and it is reported these
"were engaged by the signallers, remnants of the headquarters company, the signals officer and battalion CO."
He remarked later:
“The enemy were at times under 25 yards away and we had the pleasure of shooting at them and knowing that we could not miss”.’
Only Brown and six of the Welsh escaped to the 21st Middlesex headquarters in Winter’s Night Post. Parties of the German storm troops then headed for Fleurbaix, but others outflanked the 13th Surreys and Lieutenant Colonel Metcalfe’s last message reported “they were behind his support trenches”.
Major General Ponsonby instructed 120th Brigade to cross the River Lys and man the line of this ‘Battle Zone’, but the Germans had reached Laventie first, Brigadier General Hobkirk was forced to deployed his men in the ‘Green Line’, finding however nothing more than shallow ditches to fight from.
The 10/11th Highland Light Infantry, the 14th Highland Light Infantry and the 14th Argylls were soon engaged in the mist and only 400 men survived the running battle back to Sailly-sur-Lys. There they found Lieutenant Colonel Utterson-Kelso and the rest of the 2nd Scots Fusiliers guarding the bridges. The Portuguese retreated so quickly across the Lys on 9 April, they left 40th Division’s flank exposed and 50th Division were forced to cover the bridges between Sailly and Estaires. The 2nd Portuguese Division were holding the Neuve Chapelle-Richebourg l’Avoué positions which meant General Gomes da Costa’s men had been holding a 5½-mile sector along the Layes stream.
Only a few men of 119 Brigade reached Bac St Maur on the River Lys where the engineers were preparing to demolish the bridges. The main bridge was a challenge because it ‘was built on the remains of the permanent bridge that had been wrecked in the earlier months of the war. It now consisted of heavy timber trestles, bedded on to the old stone foundation piers, carrying a substantial roadway capable of taking all ordinary traffic.’
Nearly a ton of explosives had been stacked around the centre trestles and the engineers of 224th Field Company were busy checking their equipment: Lieutenant Carr had received instructions to:
“defer the destruction of the bridge until the last possible moment, to allow the maximum amount of transport to cross the river.”
The terminal box in the dug-out was unfastened and the leads tested for continuity at hourly intervals. As the morning advanced and the fog cleared, it became evident to those stationed at Bac St Maur that the enemy must be advancing rapidly if the volume of traffic westward over the bridge was taken as an index. For hours a mixed multitude, consisting of civilian refugees, Portuguese soldiers and transport of every description streamed steadily across the Lys. Bac St Maur was repeatedly shelled and the queue of traffic halted when a shell burst hit a team of horses on the bridge. It was some time before it was cleared, and a new team hauled the howitzer clear. The last man to cross was 34th Division’s GSO, Major Tower, early in the afternoon. When the ‘enemy machine gunners obtained a footing in the houses on the east side of the Lys, they commenced machine-gun fire on the bridge.
2nd Lieut. Harold Champney, second son of Frederick Champney a cloth manufacturer. He was living in Scarborough when commissioned into the Teesside Pioneers, becoming a Platoon Commander of W Coy. X Coy were located at RUE DE QUESNOY, W Coy at SAILLY SUR LA LYS, with the Battalions Supply Transport near CROIX-DE-BAC.
At 4.00am on 9th April 1918, the enemy opened a heavy bombardment on all billets occupied by the Bn. At 6.00 am the Bn. "stood to" in billets, when at 11.15 am orders were received from HQ 40th Div. for 2 Coys to occupy a line of trenches in front of BAC ST MAUR from SAILLY S to RUE de BAC.
At 11.30am "X" Coy were then ordered to proceed to FLUERBAIX to reinforce the garrison there. When X Coy reached BALETTE FARM, however they encountered the enemy and being heavily pressed fought a rear-guard action back to the left bank of the RIVER LYS, taking up a position near Pt.de.La BOUDRETTE with a Coy. Of Royal Engineers on their left.
At 11.30am W & Y Coy's took up the line from SAILLY S. to RUE De BIACHE. They had only been in position 5 minutes when the enemy attacked in large numbers with many light machine guns and the Pioneer Coys. were forced to retire.
2nd Lt CHAMPNEY and 15 men with 1 Lewis Gun covered the retirement of W Coy. and it was largely due to the excellent way in which 2/Lt. Champey handled his men that W Coy got safely away. 2nd Lt. Champney was reported to have fired the Lewis Gun himself until the enemy were within 20 yards and he was later reportedly killed.
"W & Y" Coy's after close fighting, in which a German prisoner was captured, eventually took up a position on the left bank of the RIVER LYS and this position was held until about 4:00pm, when the left flank of the Battalion was forced to withdraw about 1000 yds due to the enemy again working round their left flank.
About 6.00pm a Bde. of 25th Div. arrived with the intention of taking CROIX DE BAC, ST MAUR and SAILLY. The Teesside Bn. took part and counter attacked on the right flank of this Bde. with 5th Yorks, 50th Div. on right. The counterattack was unsuccessful...
Following the withdrawal of 40th Div. the Teesside Battalion, had only 300 or so men uninjured, the rest had been either captured, wounded or killed. At 2.00am on 10.4.18 a Bde of 25th Div. counter attacked again. 12th Yorks W & Y Coy's were in reserve with Y Coy detailed to protect the right flank. This attack was partially successful, and the river was reached but the enemy attacked again and drove the British back to their original position and eventually, into STEENWERCK SWITCH, were the 12th Bn. (Less 1 Coy) came under orders of Lt.Col. Brown MC Commanding a MISC. Bn. 119th Bde.
One coy was withdrawn about 8.00am into reserve at PETIT MORTIER and about 2.00pm a message was received from 14th HLI that enemy were attacking and this Coy moved up to reinforce 14th HLI on the left of STEENWERCK SWITCH, on 11.4.18 The Teesside Battalion men were still mixed up with the MISC Bn. and conformed to movements under the orders of Lt.Col. Brown MC. until the 40th Div was finally relieved. On the night of 11/12th May the Bn. was finally withdrawn from the line near STATZEELE.
40th Div. was badly depleted never mind the Teesside Pioneers by this action, and The Teesside Bn. was broken up on the 11th May 1918, with 10 Officers and 51 OR’s forming a Battalion Training Staff.
The remaining 10 Officers and 350 O.R.’s were entrained at WATTEN at 5.00pm headed for the Base Depot at CALAIS. The Training Cadre were held in billets near KINDERBELCK and LES CINQ RUES resting.
Lt.Col. HW BECHER DSO, then recovered from his wounding in the battle, took over command of the Bn. again, from Major (a/LT.COL) TH CARLISLE DSO. MC. R.E. at LA BELLE HOTESSE. The Battalion Training Staff, were then moved by motor bus into tents and bivouacs near LA BELLE HOTESSE. This Training Staff were then absorbed into the establishment of 17th (Garrison) Bn. WORCESTER REGT. Lt/Col HW BECHER assumed command of the now 17th Bn. WORCESTER REGT. (Pioneers)
The 12th (S) Bn. Yorkshire Regiment then formally ceased to exist...
Middlesbrough in line with most towns cities and villages erected a war memorial situated in Middlesbrough, North Yorkshire, England and is located just off Linthorpe Road outside the entrance gates to Albert Park in front of the Dorman Museum.
It commemorates those local men who died in the First and Second World Wars and other conflicts.
The cenotaph was built on land given by Sir Arthur Dorman who favoured a replica of The Cenotaph in Whitehall, London. Designed by Brierley and Rutherford of York, it was based on the design of Lutyens, Whitehall Cenotaph.
The Cenotaph was constructed using polished grey Aberdeen granite ashlar in 1922 by masons Messrs Coxhead of Middlesbrough at a cost of over £17,000 and stands over 10m high.
It was unveiled on 11 November 1922 by the deputy mayor of Middlesbrough J.G. Pallister in memory of over 3,000 local men from the Yorkshire Regiment and others who died in the First World War and was added to after the Second World War, again with the names of those local men who died during this later conflict...
Sport, especially football has always been important to the people not only of Middlesbrough but to Teesside as a whole. When ‘the Boro’ finally left its home at Ayresome Park in the centre of Middlesbrough, the Original Entrance Gates were taken to their new stadium at The Riverside ground
At the same time, a commemoration of players and staff of the ‘Boro’ was created in memory of those players who served in the ‘Teesside Pioneers, such as the club Captain henry Cook and the club Secretary Tom McIntosh
In 1903 the ground at Ayresome Park was opened and through various iterations finally closed its gates in 1995, the ground was finally demolished in 1997.
A painting was commissioned in 2118 in time for the Centenary of the end of The Great War showing the men who ‘joined up’ and did their Town Proud….
On the day Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, which was reportedly what kicked off ‘The Great War’, Boro had kicked off by battering South Bank 11-1 in a local friendly as they geared up for the coming seasons campaign, soon players were joining up along with millions of others and football faded into insignificance. After Christmas a much-changed Boro side were becalmed in mid-table and a team touted as likely champions finished 12th.
Late in September the allies had won the Battle of the Marne to stop the German advance, and the long networks of trenches began to appear as the armies dug in. By October and the First Battle of Ypres the casualties of almost 8,000 dead and 30,000 wounded, brought the enormity of war firmly home. It was clear it wouldn’t be over by Christmas. Of the side that started the season ripe with opportunity in Red, four were to finish it wearing khaki as part of the ‘Teesside Pioneers’. The football authorities were in two minds whether to scrap the season, as a reflection of the depth of the losses and for public morale. The fixtures were however finished but the second half of the season fizzled out as skeleton sides filleted of stars went through the motions, distorting the competitive balance and rendering the table almost meaningless.
For the Fallen…by Laurence Binyon
With proud thanksgiving, a mother for her children,
England mourns for her dead across the sea.
Flesh of her flesh they were, spirit of her spirit,
Fallen in the cause of the free.
Solemn the drums thrill: Death august and royal
Sings sorrow up into immortal spheres.
There is music in the midst of desolation
And a glory that shines upon our tears.
They went with songs to the battle, they were young,
Straight of limb, true of eye, steady and aglow.
They were staunch to the end against odds uncounted,
They fell with their faces to the foe.
They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old:
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.
They mingle not with their laughing comrades again;
They sit no more at familiar tables of home;
They have no lot in our labour of the day-time;
They sleep beyond England’s foam.
But where our desires are and our hopes profound,
Felt as a well-spring that is hidden from sight,
To the innermost heart of their own land they are known, As the stars are known to the Night;
As the stars that shall be bright when we are dust,
Moving in marches upon the heavenly plain,
As the stars that are starry in the time of our darkness,
To the end, to the end, they remain.
They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old:
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.
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